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AN OVERVIEW OF THE
TAX STATUS OF
EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS
MILTON CERNY, ESQUIRE
Twelve years ago, Randolph Thrower, the former Commissioner of
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), embarked upon the uncharted course
of administering a racially nondiscriminatory policy for private schools,
and was faced with the complex Tax Reform Act of 19691 which estab-
lished new rules for private foundations. He mused one day that if the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had access to the Oracle of Delphi, it
would pose this question: "What do you see ahead for the IRS in the field
of exempt organizations?" The Oracle's short and cryptic response, would
no doubt be "Trouble." With her traditional penchant for ambiguity, the
Oracle was not clear in explaining for whom trouble was foreseen. Thus,
each was left to interpret this for himself.
Upon reflection, it appears that she was about as accurate as today's
weather forecasters. The administration of the racially nondiscriminatory
policy for private schools has proved and continues to be a problem for
the IRS. The statute regarding private foundations, on the other hand,
has worked well, and many of the actual and perceived problems about
private foundations that troubled Congress at that time have been
corrected.
If one were to ask for the sage wisdom of that Oracle again, would he
receive the same ambiguous reply? "Trouble" certainly looms on the hori-
zon in a number of areas but there are also signs of hope. In the private
school area the good news is that the Supreme Court has agreed to hear
the appeal in Bob Jones2 and Goldsboro' and, it is hoped, will clarify the
interpretation of the law in this area. On the administrative side the IRS
I.R.C. §§ 4940-4948 (1980).
' Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980), afl'd, 103 S. Ct. 2017
(1983).
I Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States, 644 F.2d 879 (4th Cir.), aft'd, 103 S.
Ct. 2017 (1983).
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has developed a new forip 990 and 990PF for 1981, a uniform report that
will also be used by thirty-three states for reporting purposes. The result-
ing elimination of wasteful duplication and paperwork will save exempt
organizations an estimated $125 million per year. This is an outstanding
example of how state, federal and voluntary organizations can work to-
gether in the development of a reporting system that serves the needs of
all parties in the simplest way possible.
That is the good news. The bad news, depending upon your perspec-
tive, is that difficult problems lay ahead in challenges to the IRS' author-
ity to determine whether certain educational and lobbying organizations
are tax exempt under sections 501(a) and 501(c)(3).' The Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit has rendered two opinions that
establish constitutional limitations on the Service's authority to adminis-
ter the tax law. The first case involved the denial of exemption under
section 501(c)(3) to Big Mama Rag, Inc. which published only profeminist
articles in its newspaper and other literature.' The Service found that Big
Mama Rag's publications failed to meet the "full and fair" exposition test
of regulation 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3). 6 The district court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the regulations.' On appeal, however, the circuit court re-
versed, and declared regulation 1.501(c)(3)-1(d) unconstitutional as being
violative of the first amendment." The Government decided not to appeal
further, but chose instead to litigate the point in a parallel case, National
Alliance v. United States.9 National Alliance published a monthly news-
paper and bulletin devoted to racist material. 10 The IRS denied 501(c)(3)
exemption because the organization did not meet the "full and fair" ex-
' Under section 501(a), organizations listed under section 501(c) are exempt from taxation.
Section 501(c)(3) describes such organizations as:
[clorporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and oper-
ated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary,
or educational purposes . . .. or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals,
no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder
or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda,
or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation . . . and which does not participate
in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any politi-
cal campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1980).
1 Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 494 F. Supp. 473, 475 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd, 631 F.2d
1030, 1034-35 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
6 494 F. Supp. at 477; see Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3) (1959).
494 F. Supp. at 480-81.
8 Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030, 1034-35 (D.C. Cir. 1980), rev'g 494 F.
Supp. 473 (D.D.C. 1979).
48 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 1 81-5029, at 81-5138 (D.D.C. 1981).
10 Id. at 81-5140.
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position test." In a declaratory judgment, the district court, without
reaching a decision on whether the organization qualified for exemption,
followed the Big Mama Rag precedent and remanded the case to the IRS
for further proceedings.12 The Government has appealed this decision
based on the educational methodology approach it has used for the past
20 years in applying the "full and fair" exposition test.
The. other significant case involved an educational lobbying organiza-
tion, Taxation with Representation (Taxation), that applied for exemp-
tion under section 501(c)(3) of the Code. In a seven-to-three decision, the
District of Columbia Circuit Court held that the Internal Revenue Code's
restriction on lobbying by charitable and educational groups "fail[ed] to
meet the constitutional standard," and reversed a district court decision
upholding 501(c)(3)'s restrictions on substantial lobbying by charities,
educational organizations, and churches." The court remanded the case
to the district court with directions to devise a remedy that would cure
the constitutionally invalid operation of section 501(c)(3). " Under cur-
rent law, charities cannot engage in "substantial" lobbying, unlike veter-
ans organizations which can lobby freely despite their tax-exempt status.
Prior to this decision, the Service had won a series of cases holding that
the lobbying limitation in section 501(c)(3) does not abridge first amend-
ment rights.15 The appeals court agreed that Taxation had no compelling
claims based solely on the first amendment since section 501(c)(3) limita-
tions do not directly abridge its rights of free speech. 6 The court held,
however, that the differing tax treatment of tax-exempt lobbying groups
receiving deductible contributions, such as veterans and fraternal groups,
involves unequal levels of government subsidy of first amendment
rights.1 7 The court could find no substantial reason to justify the discrimi-
natory treatment of Taxation's activities, and held that such treatment
constituted a denial of equal protection.18
In remanding the case to the district court, it was suggested that ei-
ther all 501(c)(3) organizations be allowed to lobby or that the district
court permit veterans organizations to participate in framing the relief.1"
Interim remedies suggested by the court were that the Service could pro-
i Id. at 81-5139 to -5140.
1' Id. at 81-5142.
IS Taxation with Representation v. Regan, 676 F.2d 715, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
14 Id.
"5 See Taxation with Representation v. United States, 585 F.2d 1219, 1223 (4th Cir. 1978);
Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1148-49 (Ct. Cl. 1974); Christian Echoes Nat'l Min-
istry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 857 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973).
" 676 F.2d at 724.
See id. at 731.
Id. at 740.
Id. at 742-45.
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vide more restrictive regulations governing lobbying activities of veterans
organizations, or provide more diligent enforcement of existing lobbying
regulations. 0 The Government has asked for a stay of the court's man-
date, and has filed a direct appeal to the Supreme Court pursuant to fed-
eral statute.2 '
It is submitted that the court erred in its determination that the clas-
sification adopted by Congress in section 501(c) is subject to strict judi-
cial scrutiny and thereby unconstitutional unless that classification serves
a substantial governmental interest. The discussion in the Government's
supplemental brief for the en banc rehearing makes clear that in the area
of taxation, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classification, and
that, in the absence of invidious discrimination or substantial infringe-
ment of a fundamental right, a tax classification may not be disturbed if
it is rationally related to the achievement of a legitimate governmental
purpose.2"
As the dissenting opinion in the Taxation case rightfully indicates,
exemption under 501(c)(3) is based upon the theory that the Government
is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from the financial bur-
den that would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from other
public funds and by the benefits resulting from the promotion of the gen-
eral welfare.2 3 Thus, the Government has conferred tax benefits on those
organizations seeking taxpayer support in order to encourage particular
kinds of activity in the public interest and has imposed the lobbying re-
striction as a means to ensure that the benefit is issued directly to further
the purposes Congress sought to encourage.
Accordingly, it can be argued that Congress is free to determine the
conditions under which veterans groups may be worthy of certain bene-
fits, while other groups with charitable or educational purposes may not
be. When Congress determines that two organizations serve significantly
different purposes or present significantly different regulatory problems,
the Constitution does not require it to afford them identical treatment.2 "
The litigation in these areas is significant because, unlike ordinary at-
tempts to reverse individual IRS determinations, the cases have sought
by judicial action to establish blanket exemptions for two whole classes of
organizations presently ineligible to qualify for exemption under the stat-
20 Id. at 744.
2 The United States has filed a direct appeal to the Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1252 (1976).
22 See Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 656-57 (1981);
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355-56 (1974); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 50-51, 54-55 (1973).
2" 676 F.2d at 752 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
2, See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co.,
410 U.S. 356, 359 (1973).
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ute and regulations.
Two other recently decided cases are also important. In Suffolk
County Patrolman's Benevolent Association, Inc. v. Commissioner,2 a
test as to what constitutes "regularly carried on" for the purpose of unre-
lated trade or business was finally established. In Suffolk County, the or-
ganization conducted an annual vaudeville show and in conjunction pub-
lished and distributed a program guide containing extensive paid
advertising solicited by a commercial promoter.26 The promotor's solicita-
tion covered a 2-to-4-month period and employed a significant number of
professional solicitors. 2 The court held that since the distribution was
made during an annual event and "for only a few weeks," it was not "reg-
ularly carried on."2 8 The IRS will not appeal this decision but will con-
tinue to defend those cases in which prolonged commercially oriented ad-
vertising solicitations or separate distributions evidence an autonomous
program independent of the event.
The other recent case involves a hospital's sale of pharmaceuticals to
the private patients of its staff doctors. 9 The court held that these sales
did not result in unrelated business income because the service was neces-
sary to attract doctors to the rural community. The court distinguished
Revenue Ruling 68-375, which holds that hospital pharmacy sales to the
general public are an unrelated trade or business. 30 Due to the unique
facts in this case, the IRS also will not appeal this decision.
The final area that has caused the IRS great concern and has shaken
public confidence in the tax system involves the use of "mail order"
churches as a tax-protesting device to decrease or eliminate federal in-
come tax liability. This is not only an IRS concern but should be a major
concern to all bona fide religious groups when organizations of this nature
abuse the tax system for private benefit. These organizations are typically
established by an individual who has purchased his minister's credentials
and church charter by mail from an organization that may not itself be
exempt from tax. The individual then "establishes" his own church, takes
a vow of poverty and assigns all of his assets and income to the church.
The IRS has taken a strict approach in interpreting the standards for
qualification and has denied a number of these sham churches. The Ser-
vice has also attacked the income tax deductions claimed by these indi-
viduals as contributions and has disallowed excessive wages and parson-
age allowances. Even though the Service has an effective enforcement
s77 T.C. 1314 (1981).
26 Id. at 1316-17.
27 Id. at 1317-18.
" Id. at 1320.
29 Hi-Plains Hosp. v. United States, 670 F.2d 528, 530 (5th Cir. 1982).
30 Id. at 531; Rev. Rul. 68-375, 1968-2 C.B. 245.
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program and has won over forty cases that it has litigated in this area,
there remains a widely held perception that organizations of this nature
enjoy tax-exempt status while the public carries an ever increasing tax
burden.
Action has been taken by several states using restraining orders to
prevent these organizations from selling mail order certificates. In an im-
portant decision, People v. Life Science Church,1 the Supreme Court of
the State of New York held that the organization was permanently en-
joined from selling church kits and ordered restitution to the purchasers
exceeding $16 million." ' This case was brought under the state consumer
fraud statute and the promoters were fined for both civil and criminal
contempt. 8 A number of states with similar statutes are looking to this
decision to protect their citizens from these pyramid schemes. This is not
a first amendment issue of free exercise or establishment of religion.
Rather, it is a basic issue of legal compliance with the tax laws.
113 Misc. 2d 952, 450 N.Y.S.2d 664 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1982).
s' Id. at 970-71, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 676-77.
IS Id. at 969-70, 450 N.Y.S.2d at 676.
